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United States v. Williams: What The
Grand Jury Doesn't Know Won't Hurt
The Prosecutor
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states
in part that: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment
of a Grand Jury. . . ."' The federal grand jury serves the dual
purpose of investigating whether a crime has been committed and
determining if there is probable cause to hold an accused for trial.2
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974);
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 687 (1972) (stating that the Fifth Amendment requires indictment
by grand jury in order to prosecute capital or otherwise serious crimes in federal court). The Supreme
Court has held that infamous crimes, as they relate to the Grand Jury Clause, are determined by the
statutorily authorized punishment for the specific offense. Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348,
350-51 (1886); see FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a) (specifying that offenses punishable by death, imprisonment
for more than one year or at hard labor, shall be prosecuted by indictment). Federal law defines a
felony as an offense punishable by death or imprisonment for more than one year, thus making all
federal felonies infamous crimes requiring indictment by grand jury. 18 U.S.C. § 1(1) (1989). See
generally LasTER B. ORPiELD, ORiELD's CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES § 7:16
(2d ed. 1985) (defining infamous crimes under the Fifth Amendment). An indictment is a formal
accusation charging an individual with a crime. Elder v. United States, 142 F.2d 199, 200 (9th Cir.
1944); see FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1) (requiring indictments to be a plain, concise and definite written
statement of the essential facts constituting a charged offense). An indictment must describe with
particularity and certainty the essential elements of the offense so that an accused will not be subject
to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974);
United States v. McDonough, 959 F.2d 1137, 1140 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Sutton, 961 F.2d
476, 479 (4th Cir. 1992). An indictment is not evidence that the charged offense was committed and
may not be considered as evidence by a trial jury. United States v. Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8, 15 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1121 (1969). The Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment is one
of the few provisions in the Bill of Rights that does not apply to the individual states. 1 SARA SUN
BEALE & WILI.Am C. BRYSoN, GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 2:01, at 2 (1986). In Hurtado
v. California, the Supreme Court considered whether due process under the Fourteenth Amendment
required states to indict criminal defendants as provided by the Fifth Amendment. Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516, 519-20 (1884). The Supreme Court held that California's information
system was a constitutionally permissible alternative to grand jury indictments in state proceedings.
ld. at 538. The Hurtado Court concluded that any state proceeding which preserved fundamental
principles of liberty and justice constituted due process. Id. at 537.
2. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 686-87; see 1 BEALE & BRYsON, supra note 1, § 1:07; 1 WAYNE
R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 8.1 (1984) (discussing the grand jury's
investigative and indicting functions). The federal grand jury serves an important law enforcement
function by investigating the existence of criminal activity. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 701-02. Through
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Once considered a shield against wrongful prosecution, the modem
grand jury is often seen as a powerful and easily abused weapon of
the prosecutor.3 Federal prosecutors can abuse the indictment
a court's subpoena and contempt powers, the grand jury may compel the appearance and testimony
of witnesses. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 572 (1976); Calandra, 414 U.S. at 343;
Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 49 (1959); see FED. R. CRIM. P. 17, 42 (specifying provisions
of the federal subpoena power and authorizing federal courts to exercise criminal contempt power);
see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1989) (providing that a witness may be compelled to testify under
threat of contempt when granted immunity from prosecution). The grand jury also protects against
improper prosecution by insuring that criminal charges are based on probable cause and not maliec
or personal ill will. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 59 (1906). Currently, there is no generally agreed
upon standard in the federal system for measuring probable cause to return an indictment. Peter
Arenella, Reforming the Federal Grand Jury and the State Preliminary Hearing to Prevent
Conviction Without Adjudication 78 MICH. L. Rev. 463,485 (1980). Some courts require the grand
jury to find facts that would support the conclusion that a crime has probably been committed by the
accused. 2 LAFAE & ISRAEL, supra, § 15.2, at 287-88; Arenella, supra, at 485. Other courts require
the grand jury to find that there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction of the accused at trial.
2 LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra, § 15.2, at 287-88; Arenella, supra, at 486. A grand jury indictment, if
valid on its face, creates a presumption that probable cause exists to believe that the accused
committed the offense charged. McCarthy v. Mayo, 827 F.2d 1310, 1316-17 (9th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Roth, 777 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1985). An indictment that properly pleads a criminal
offense is not subject to challenge on the theory that it lacked probable cause. United States v.
iemhan, 756 F. Supp. 143, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); United States v. Whitehom, 710 F. Supp. 803,825
(D.D.C. 1989).
3. See Arenella, supra note 2, at 474 (stating that ordinary citizens who comprise the grand
jury cannot screen out unwarranted prosecutions when they take direction from the prosecutor and
hear only the prosecutor's side of a case); William J. Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 174, 178-79 (1973) (arguing that the federal grand jury should be
abolished because it no longer functions as a protector of citizens from unwarranted prosecutions);
Robert G. Johnston, The Grand Jury-ProsecutorialAbuse of the Indictment Process, 65 J. CraM. L.
& CRIMno.ooY 157 (1974) (stating that the grand jury has come under increasing attack as an
inefficient, expensive, and unnecessary institution). But see Thomas P. Sullivan & Robert D.
Nachman, IfIt Ain't Broke, Don 't Fix It: Why the Grand Jury's Accusatory Function Should Not Be
Changed, 75 J. CrMi. L. & CRIMINOLOOY 1047, 1049 (1984) (arguing that the federal grand jury
should be retained because it adequately serves the function of accusing persons suspected of
committing crimes).
The grand jury arose in England in 1166 during the reign of King Henry II. MARvIN E.
FRANKEL & GARY P. NAFrAUS, THE GRAND JURY: AN INSTITrION ON TRIAL 6 (1977). The grand
jury was established as an investigative agency of the King. Id The King used the grand jury to gain
power over the church and feudal barons, Id at 7. The grand jury was comprised of sixteen men from
the community who were obligated to accuse anyone they suspected of crimes against the crown.
LEROY D. CLARK, Tan GRAND JURY: THE USE AND ABUSE OF PoLrncAL. PowER 8-9 (1975). Thus,
the original grand jury had solely an accusatory function rather than a protective function. FRANKEL
& NArrAus, supra, at 7. Over the next few centuries, the grand jury began to assume a significant
degree of independence. Id at 9. In 1681, King Charles II sought to charge two members of the
Protestant opposition with treason. Id The grand jury resisted the King's attempts to influence the
proceedings and eventually refused to issue an indictment. Id This assertion of power by the grand
jury led to its emergence as a protector of citizens against malicious and oppressive government. Id.
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process through their ability to selectively present the evidence that
a grand jury hears.4 The prosecutor's discretion in presenting
evidence has raised the question of whether federal prosecutors
have a legal or ethical obligation to present exculpatory evidence
to a grand jury.'
Traditionally, federal prosecutors have not been required to
disclose exculpatory evidence during indictment proceedings.6
Several lower federal courts, however, stated that indictments
should be dismissed for a prosecutor's failure to disclose
exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.7 Whether a prosecutor was
required to present exculpatory evidence depended partly on how
a federal court perceived the grand jury's role in a criminal
prosecution.' Equally important were a court's views on
prosecutorial misconduct and a court's willingness to exercise its
supervisory power to dismiss a grand jury indictment.9 Courts that
required the prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence claimed
that the grand jury could not prevent wrongful indictments unless
The concept of the grand jury as both an accusatory body and a protector of citizens from arbitrary
prosecution, was carried over from England to the American colonies. Id. at 10-11. The requirement
that a grand jury initiate felony prosecutions was later incorporated into the Fifth Amendment.
CLARK, supra, at 19-20. See generally I W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY Op ENGLISH LAW 321-23 (7th
rev. ed. 1956); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES 300 (1769) (discussing the historical development
of the grand jury).
4. See Arenella, supra note 2, at 474; Campbell, supra note 3, at 174; Johnston, supra note
3, at 161 (discussing the prosecutor's ability to control indictment proceedings); see also infra notes
49-83 and accompanying text (discussing prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jury).
5. BENNErr L. GERSHMAN, PRosEcUTroRiAL MIscoNDuCr § 2.6, at 2-42.2 (1992) (discussing
the arguments supporting and opposing a prosecutor's obligation to present exculpatory evidence to
a grand jury); see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 566 (6th ed. 1990) (defining exculpatory evidence as
evidence which tends to negate an accused's guilt).
6. 1 BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 1, § 6:03, at 15 (stating that federal courts have
traditionally not required prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Page, 808 F.2d 723,728 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 482 U.S.
918 (1987); United States v. Bucci, 839 F.2d 825, 831 n.8 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 844
(1988); United States v. Flomenhoft, 714 F.2d 708,711 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068
(1984); United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 623 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Dorfman,
532 F. Supp. 1118, 1131 (N.D. Ill. 1981); United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 435 F. Supp. 610,
618 (N.D. Okla. 1977) (stating that prosecutors have a duty to present substantial exculpatory
evidence to the grand jury).
8. See infra notes 49-120 and accompanying text (discussing prosecutorial misconduct and
the theories for dismissing a grand jury indictment).
9. See infra notes 49-120 and accompanying text (discussing prosecutorial misconduct and
the theories for dismissing a grand jury indictment).
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apprised of all relevant information."° Courts opposing such a rule
argued that indictments are merely preliminary proceedings, and
that an accused has the opportunity to contest a criminal accusation
at trial.11 Disagreement over whether prosecutors had a duty to
disclose exculpatory evidence to the grand jury led to inconsistent
procedural rulings among lower federal courts.
12
The United States Supreme Court recently resolved the conflict
that existed between federal courts in United States v. Williams.
13
In Williams, the Supreme Court held that lower federal courts may
not use their inherent supervisory power to dismiss an indictment
when the prosecutor fails to present exculpatory evidence to a
grand jury.14 The Court concluded that a prosecutor's withholding
of exculpatory evidence does not constitute prosecutorial
misconduct that would justify dismissing an otherwise valid
indictment.15 As a result of the Court's holding, prosecutors are
free to obtain a knowingly wrongful indictment by withholding
exculpatory evidence from the grand jury.16  Although an
indictment is merely a preliminary accusation, the practical
consequences of a criminal indictment can be tantamount to a
10. See Page, 808 F.2d at 727-28; Flomenhoft, 714 F.2d at 711-12; Ciambrone, 601 F.2d at
622-23; Dorfnan, 532 F. Supp. at 1131; Phillips Petroleum Co., 435 F. Supp. at 618 (stating that
the proper functioning of the grand jury requires that it be appraised of information necessary to
making an independent and informed decision about whether to indict).
11. See United States v. Larrazolo, 869 F.2d 1354, 1359 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Hawkins, 765 F.2d 1482, 1488 (11th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1103 (1986); United States
v. Adamo, 742 F.2d 927, 936 (6th Cir. 1984) (stating that prosecutors are under no duty to present
exculpatory evidence to the grand jury because it is a non-adversarial proceeding).
12. Compare Page, 808 F.2d at 727-28; Bucci, 839 F.2d at 831 n.8; Flomenhoft, 714 F.2d at
712; Ciambrone, 601 F.2d at 623 (stating that prosecutors have a duty to present substantial
exculpatory evidence to the grand jury) with Larrazolo, 869 F.2d at 1359; Hawkins, 765 F.2d 1488;
Adamo, 742 F.2d 936 (holding that prosecutors are under no duty to present exculpatory evidence
to the grand jury); see also infra notes 66-80 and accompanying text (discussing a prosecutor's duty
to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury).
13. 112 S. CL 1735 (1992); see infra notes 146-205 and accompanying text (discussing the
facts and holding in United States v. Williams).
14. Williams, 112 S. CL at 1746; see infra notes 97-120 and accompanying text (discussing
the use of supervisory power to dismiss grand jury indictments).
15. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1746.
16. See infra note 267 (discussing the possibility for improper use of the indictment process
by prosecutors).
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conviction on the merits." The Williams opinion compromises the
grand jury's ability to prevent improper indictments by placing the
decision to disclose substantial exculpatory evidence completely in
the hands of the prosecutor. 8
This Note examines the United States Supreme Court's holding
that federal courts may not invoke their supervisory power to
dismiss an indictment for a prosecutor's failure to present
exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. Part I discusses the
evolution of evidentiary challenges to grand jury indictments in
federal courts.19 Part ll reviews the majority and dissenting
opinions of the Supreme Court in United States v. Williams.
20
Finally, Part III assesses the legal ramifications that the Williams
decision may have on future grand jury proceedings.21
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The United States Supreme Court has declined to set standards
for the quality of evidence supporting a grand jury's decision to
indict.2 The general rule is that grand jury indictments may not
be challenged on evidentiary grounds.23 The Supreme Court has
suggested that indictments are valid regardless of the amount of
evidence presented to a grand jury.24 Federal courts that required
a prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence to the grand jury
avoided reviewing the quality of evidence supporting an indictment
by focusing on whether a prosecutor's failure to present
exculpatory evidence prevented the grand jury from rendering an
17. See infra notes 268-271 and accompanying text (discussing the practical consequences of
a wrongful indictment).
18. See infra notes 259-274 and accompanying text (discussing the detrimental effect that the
Williams decision will have on the grand jury's ability to screen out unfounded accusations).
19. See infra notes 22-145 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 146-233 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 234-292 and accompanying test.
22. See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956) (stating that the adequacy or
competency of the evidence supporting a grand jury's decision to indict may not be questioned); see
also infra notes 31-38 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Courts holding in Costello).
23. Costello, 350 U.S. at 363.
24. See Ed. (stating that a grand jury indictment is valid even when there is very little evidence
against the accused).
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independent and unbiased decision.' These courts viewed the
prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence as misconduct
that justified dismissing an otherwise valid indictment.26 However,
the legal principles relied upon by lower federal courts to sustain
challenges to the validity of grand jury indictments have been
limited by subsequent Supreme Court cases.27  To better
understand the Court's decision in United States v. Williams, the
evolution of evidentiary challenges to federal grand jury
indictments will be reviewed.
A. Challenging Indictments on Evidentiary Grounds
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to sustain challenges to
the sufficiency or competency of the evidence supporting a federal
grand jury indictment.2" The Court has stressed that grand jury
indictments are merely preliminary proceedings in which the rules
of evidence do not apply.29 Defendants are given the opportunity
to contest the evidence supporting a criminal accusation at trial,
and permitting a defendant to challenge the validity of a grand jury
25. United States v. Page, 808 F.2d 723 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 918 (1987);
United States v. Flomenhoft, 714 F.2d 708 (7th Cir. 1983), cer. denied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984);
United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Dorfman, 532 F. Supp.
1118 (N.D. IIl. 1981); United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 435 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Okla. 1977);
see 2 LAFAVE & IsRAEL, supra note 2, § 15.4(b), at 306 (stating that the Supreme Court's rule in
Costello v. United States provides support for dismissing an indictment when the prosecutor's
misconduct prevents the grand jury from rendering an unbiased decision); see also Costello, 350 U.S.
at 363 (holding that an indictment is valid if returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand
jury).
26. Page, 808 F.2d at 728; Flomenhoft, 714 F.2d at 711; Ciambrone, 601 F.2d at 623;
Dorfinan, 532 F. Supp. at 1131-32; Phillips Petroleum Co., 435 F. Supp. at 618; see infra notes 49-
120 and accompanying text (discussing prosecutorial misconduct during grand jury proceedings and
dismissal as a remedy for prosecutorial misconduct).
27. See infra notes 121-145 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court holdings that
have limited the ability of lower federal courts to dismiss grand jury indictments).
28. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974) (holding that the exclusionary
rule could not be invoked by a grand jury witness to bar questions based on unconstitutionally seized
evidence); Costello, 350 U.S. at 363 (holding that a grand jury indictment may not be challenged on
the grounds that the indictment was based on hearsay evidence).
29. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 349.50; Costello, 350 U.S. at 363-64.
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indictment will only lead to unnecessary delays in criminal
prosecutions.3"
In Costello v. United States,31 the Supreme Court considered
the validity of a grand jury indictment based solely on hearsay
evidence.32 The Court noted that the Fifth Amendment did not
require federal courts to review the adequacy of the evidence
presented to a grand jury.33 The grand jury has historically
functioned unhampered by technical rules, and indictments have
been upheld even when there was very little evidence against an
accused.3' An otherwise valid indictment returned by an unbiased
grand jury was sufficient to warrant a trial on the merits.3
Therefore, an indictment should be equally valid even when based
entirely on hearsay evidence.3 6 The Costello Court concluded that
neither justice nor fairness required that a defendant be permitted
to review the quality of evidence presented to a grand jury.37
Permitting a defendant to challenge the sufficiency or competency
of the evidence presented to a grand jury would only result in
seriously delaying criminal prosecutions.3"
The Costello holding was reaffirmed in United States v.
Calandra.39 In Calandra, the issue was whether a grand jury may
consider evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure.4
0
The majority noted that since the grand jury does not determine
30. Costello, 350 U.S. at 363-64.
31. 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
32. Id Costello was indicted by a grand jury for income tax evasion. Id at 360. During the
trial, it was established that hearsay statements of three government agents had formed the basis for
the indictment. Id at 361. Costello's motion for dismissal was denied and he was subsequently
convicted, lId
33. id at 363.
34. Id at 363-64.
35. I at 363.
36. lId at 363-64.
37. lid at 364.
38. lId at 363. The Supreme Court feared that defendants would always insist that the quality
of the evidence presented to the grand jury be reviewed before proceeding with a trial on the merits.
lId The Costello Court stated that such a review would lead to substantial delays in criminal
prosecutions and would add nothing to ensuring that the defendant receives a fair trial. lIt at 364.
39. 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974) (holding that evidence obtained from an illegal search and
seizure may be considered by the grand jury during indictment proceedings).
40. lId at 339.
1733
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guilt nor innocence, it historically has not been bound by the
evidentiary rules applicable to criminal trials.41 Thus, the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule did not apply to grand jury
proceedings.42 The Court reasoned that excluding illegal evidence
would have little effect on deterring future Fourth Amendment
violations, and would needlessly disrupt indictment proceedings.43
Any rule which would require "mini-trials" concerning the quality
of evidence presented to a grand jury would unduly interfere with
the expeditious administration of the criminal law.44
Some lower federal courts were uncomfortable with the
Supreme Court's holdings that grand jury indictments may not be
challenged on evidentiary grounds.45 These courts recognized that
the potential for prosecutorial abuse during grand jury proceedings
warranted some degree of judicial supervision.46 To escape the
strict holdings of Costello and Calandra, these courts justified
dismissing grand jury indictments as a remedy for prosecutorial
misconduct.47 By focusing on whether the prosecutor's conduct
prevented the grand jury from rendering an unbiased decision,
41. Id. at 349-50.
42. Id. at 354; see Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (holding that evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment cannot be used in a criminal proceeding against the
victim of an illegal search and seizure). Cf. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 405-06 (1977)
(holding that a criminal confession obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
is inadmissable against a defendant); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,491-92 (1966) (holding that
a criminal confession obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment guarantee against compelled self-
incrimination is inadmissable against an accused); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (holding
that the exclusionary rule applies equally to state criminal proceedings).
43. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354.
44. Id, at 350 (citing United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 (1973), for the proposition that
requiring a grand jury to consider the quality of the evidence it hears before returning an indictment
would severally hinder the grand jury's operation).
45. 2 LAPAVE & IsRAEL, supra note 2, § 15.4(b), at 306 (stating that the Supreme Court's
ruling in Costello has raised concern among lower federal courts that prosecutor's will have
unfettered control over grand juries).
46. United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 816 (3d Cir. 1979) (stating that the grand jury's
secrecy requirement increases the potential for prosecutorial abuse during indictment proceedings
because the prosecutor operates largely without judicial supervision or a legal adversary).
47. See United States v. Page, 808 F.2d 723,726 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 918
(1987); United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 816-17 (3d Cir. 1979) (stating that a prosecutor's
misconduct before the grand jury may warrant dismissing an indictment); see also infra notes 59-65
and accompanying text (describing various forms of prosecutorial misconduct).
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courts were able to dismiss an indictment without considering the
sufficiency or competency of the evidence presented.4"
B. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Criminal prosecutors play a major role in modem grand jury
proceedings.4 9 The prosecutor's dominance of the indictment
process is a consequence of the non-adversarial nature of grand
jury proceedings.5" The prosecutor is solely responsible for
examining witnesses, presenting evidence, and instructing the grand
jury as to the applicable law.51 The absence of a legal adversary
permits the prosecutor to influence indictment proceedings by
selectively presenting evidence to the grand jury.52 As a result, a
skillful prosecutor can often ensure the indictment of a criminal
suspect.53  Some commentators suggest that the prosecutor's
control over grand jury proceedings creates the opportunity for
48. See Costello, 350 U.S. at 363 (holding that an indictment is valid if returned by a legally
constituted and unbiased grand jury); 2 LAFAVE & IsRAEL, supra note 2, § 15.4(b), at 306 (stating
that the Supreme Court's rule in Costello v. United States, provides support for dismissing an
indictment when the prosecutor's misconduct prevents the grand jury from rendering an unbiased
decision).
49. United States v. Sells Eng'g Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 430 (1983) (stating that the effectiveness
of the modem grand jury is due in part to the assistance and resources provided by the prosecutor's
office). See generally Arenella, supra note 2; Campbell, supra note 3; Johnston supra note 3
(discussing the prosecutor's role during grand jury proceedings).
50. See Campbell, supra note 3, at 177; cf FED. R. CRaM. P. 6(d) (limiting the persons who
may be present during grand jury proceedings).
51. United States v. Hogan, 712 F.2d 757, 759 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that the prosecutor is
the one who draws the indictment, calls witnesses and advises the grand jury as to the law); United
States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1312 (9th Cir. 1977) (stating that the prosecutor determines which
witnesses to call, conducts the examination and generally determines what evidence will be presented
during indictment proceedings); United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781,785 (9th Cir. 1974) (stating
that the prosecutor is responsible for calling and examining witnesses).
52. Campbell, supra note 3, at 174; Johnston, supra note 3, at 161 (discussing the prosecutor's
ability to control indictment proceedings).
53. See Address by Chief Judge William J. Campbell, Conference of Metropolitan Chief
District Judges of the Federal Judicial Center, reprinted in 55 F.R.D. 229, 253 (1972) (stating that
experienced prosecutors will admit being able to indict almost anyone for any crime).
1735
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abuse of the indictment process unless some form of judicial
supervision is provided.5
The Supreme Court has stated that federal prosecutors are the
representatives of a sovereign which has an obligation to act
impartially.55 In criminal proceedings, therefore, the prosecutor's
duty is not to seek victory at all costs, but to ensure that justice is
done.56 The prosecutor has a good faith duty to see that persons
accused of crimes are afforded a fundamentally fair judicial
proceeding.57  The term prosecutorial misconduct generally
describes situations in which the prosecutor engages in behavior
that compromises the fairness of a proceeding in order to obtain an
indictment or conviction.58
Misconduct usually arises when the prosecutor attempts to gain
an unfair advantage over the accused or to otherwise prejudice the
judicial process.59 Common examples of prosecutorial misconduct
during grand jury proceedings generally include: (1) Improprieties
in the interrogation of witnesses;' (2) undermining a witness'
legal safeguards;61 (3) using the grand jury for illegitimate
54. See Arenella, supra note 2, at 504-05; Johnston, supra note 3, at 161 (stating that the
prosecutor's power creates the risk that the grand jury could be manipulated to obtain an indictment
when there is insufficient evidence to hold an accused for trial); Anne B. Poulin, Supervision of the
Grand Jury: Who Watchesthe Guardian?, 68 WASH. U. LQ. 885,887 (1990) (stating that the courts
must maintain continual supervision over the grand jury in order to minimize abuse by the
prosecutor).
55. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
56. Id; see United States v. Hogan, 712 F.2d 757, 760 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that the
prosecutor is sworn to ensure justice as an officer of the court).
57. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985) (holding that the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that an accused be afforded a fair trial). A trial is
fundamentally fair when the verdict results from properly admitted evidence in the absence of
improper influences. United States ex rel Crist v. Lane, 745 F.2d 476, 482 (7th Cir. 1984). A trial
is unfair when there is a reasonable probability that the verdict might have been different had the trial
been properly conducted. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112-13 (1976); see infra notes 84-87
and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional right to a fundamentally fair proceeding).
58. GERsmMAN, supra note 5, § 2.1, at 2-52; 2 BEamx & BRYSON, supra note 1, § 10.
59. GERSHMAN, supra note 5, § 2.1, at 2-5; see DAVID M. NISsMAN & ED HAoAN, THn
PROSECUTION FUNCTION 7 (1982) (discussing forms of prosecutorial misconduct).
60. See United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807,815 (3d Cir. 1979) (prosecutor insinuating that
the accused was connected with organized crime).
61. See United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (prosecutor causing
the grand jury to indict an immunized witness based on testimony given after the grant of immunity).
1736
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purposes; 62  and (4) presenting unreliable or misleading
evidence.63 Several federal courts had found that a prosecutor's
failure to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury was a
form of prosecutorial misconductr' According to these courts,
prosecutors who failed to disclose known exculpatory evidence
were deliberately misleading the grand jury and undermining an
accused's legal safeguards.6
Courts that required a prosecutor to disclose exculpatory
evidence to the grand jury have generally relied upon three
arguments to support their conclusion that failure to present
exculpatory evidence constituted prosecutorial misconduct. 6 First,
the non-adversarial nature of the grand jury imposes special
obligations on the prosecutor to ensure a fundamentally fair
proceeding.67 The prosecutor's discretion in presenting evidence
does not entitle him to mislead the grand jury or to engage in
unfair tactics.68 Second, an accused is denied a fair proceeding
62. See Brown v. United States, 245 F.2d 549,555 (8th Cir. 1957) (prosecutor using the grand
jury to elicit perjured testimony for the purpose of charging the witness with perjury).
63. See GERsH-mAN, supra note 5, § 2.1, at 2-5; see also United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d
877, 881 (9th Cir. 1979) (prosecutor misleading the grand jury into believing that a key witness was
truthful when the prosecutor knew that the witness was of doubtful credibility).
64. See United States v. Page, 808 F.2d 723,728 (10th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 482 U.S. 918
(1987); United States v. Flomenhoft, 714 F.2d 708, 711-12 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1068 (1984); United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 623 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v.
Dorfman, 532 F. Supp. 1118, 1131 (N.D. Ill. 1981); United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 435 F.
Supp. 610, 618-19 (N.D. Okla. 1977).
65. See infra notes 66-71 (describing various arguments by lower federal courts to support
their conclusion that failure to present exculpatory evidence to a grand jury is prosecutorial
misconduct).
66. See Ciambrone, 601 F.2d at 623 (arguing that knowingly withholding exculpatory
evidence is unfair); Dorfinan, 532 F. Supp. at 1131-33 (stating that the exparte nature of the grand
jury imposes a special duty on the prosecutor to ensure a fair proceeding); Phillips Petroleum Co.,
435 F. Supp. at 618-19 (arguing that the grand jury must be fully informed in order to properly indict
persons accused of a crime).
67. See Ciambrone, 601 F.2d at 623; Phillips Petroleum Co., 435 F. Supp. at 618 (stating that
the prosecutor must not mislead the grand jury by withholding exculpatory evidence).
68. See Ciambrone, 601 F.2d at 623; Phillips Petroleum Co., 435 F. Supp. at 618-19 (citing
the ethical standards espoused by the American Bar Association supporting the proposition that
prosecutors must seek justice). The American Bar Association believes that prosecutors have a basic
duty to seek justice which imposes an obligation to disclose to the grand jury any known exculpatory
evidence. ABA SECTION OF CRIMINAL JusTICE, ABA GRAND JURY PoucY AND MODEL AcT 4, 16
(2d ed. 1982) (citing ABA GRAND JuRy PRINCIPLE 3 and commentary regarding disclosure of
exculpatory evidence to the grand jury) [hereinafter "GRAND JURY PRINCIPLE"I; id. at 7, 22 (citing
1737
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 24
when a prosecutor knowingly withholds exculpatory evidence from
the grand jury.69 Justice requires that the prosecutor present
exculpatory evidence when it might reasonably prevent the grand
jury from returning an indictment.7" Finally, the grand jury cannot
protect the public from unfounded prosecutions unless relevant
information is presented.7
Federal courts that required a prosecutor to present exculpatory
evidence to the grand jury did not specifically define the quality of
evidence necessitating disclosure. 72 Although most courts required
the prosecutor to disclose evidence which clearly negated a
suspect's guilt, a uniform standard for determining what evidence
was clearly exculpatory did not develop. 73 In United States v.
ABA MODEL GRAND JURY ACT § 101 and commentary regarding a prosecutor's duty to disclose
known exculpatory evidence to the grand jury) [hereinafter "GRAND JURY ACT"]; U.S. DErr. oF
JusTIcE, UNITED STATES ATrORNEYS' MANUAL, 1 9-11.233 (1990) [hereinafter "ATroRNEYS'
MAN AL].
69. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d at 623.
70. Il
71. See United States v. Page, 808 F.2d 723, 727-28 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Flomenhoft, 714 F.2d 708, 711-12 (7th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984); Ciambrone,
601 F.2d at 622-23; Phillips Petroleum Co., 435 F. Supp. at 618 (holding that the proper functioning
of the grand jury requires that it be appraised of information necessary to making an independent and
informed decision about whether to indict). The California Supreme Court was one of the first courts
in the country to require a prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence to a grand jury. See Johnson
v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 248, 255, 539 P.2d 792, 796, 124 Cal. Rptr. 32, 36 (1975). In Johnson,
the California Supreme Court interpreted California Penal Code section 939.7, which requires grand
juries to order the presentation of evidence they believe might exonerate a defendant. Ica The court
interpreted the statute to impose an implied duty on the prosecutor to divulge exculpatory evidence
despite the absence of a grand jury's request. 15 Cal. 3d at 254, 539 P.2d at 796, 124 Cal. Rptr. at
36. The Johnson court reasoned that grand juries cannot request exculpatory evidence when they are
unaware that such evidence exists. 15 Cal. 3d at 254-55, 539 P.2d at 796, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 36. The
court required prosecutorial disclosure to ensure that a grand jury's knowledge of exculpatory
evidence at least equaled that of the prosecutor. Id
72. Mark Edward Cavenagh, Comment, Grand Jury: A Prosecutor Need Not Present
Exculpatory Evidence, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 110, 122 (1981) (discussing the difficulty
prosecutors will have in determining what evidence is exculpatory).
73. See Page, 808 F.2d at 728 (holding that personal checks marked -attorney's fees" did not
constitute clearly exculpatory evidence sufficient to negate the allegation that the checks were used
as bribes); United States v. Prevor, 583 F. Supp. 259, 260-61 (D.P.R. 1984) (holding that letters to
an insurance company explaining the basis for a property claim did not clearly negate an allegation
of insurance fraud); United States v. Dorfman, 532 F. Supp. 1118, 1134 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (holding that
the results of a polygraph test which tended to indicate the accused's innocence was not clearly
exculpatory because polygraph tests are inherently unreliable),
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Page,74 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether an
indictment should be dismissed on the grounds that the prosecutor
failed to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.7' The
Tenth Circuit stated that prosecutors have a duty to present
evidence that clearly negates a suspect's guilt.76  However, a
prosecutor is not required to "ferret out" and present all potentially
exculpatory evidence.' A prosecutor is merely obligated to reveal
any substantial exculpatory evidence that is discovered during the
course of an investigation.78 According to the Page court, judicial
economy would be promoted by requiring the prosecutor to present
exculpatory evidence.79 The circuit court reasoned that if the
presentation of exculpatory evidence would preclude a grand jury
indictment, the prosecution's case was insufficient to secure a
conviction at trial.8"
In order to remedy prosecutorial misconduct, courts have
justified dismissing indictments on either a constitutional theory or
as an exercise of the their inherent supervisory power.81 When
misconduct amounted to a violation of an accused's right to a
74. 808 F.2d 723 (10th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 482 U.S. 918 (1987).
75. Id at 726. Defendant Page was convicted of racketeering and extortion under color of
official right as an assistant district attorney and as a special district judge. Id. at 725. Page had
allegedly accepted bribes in exchange for "fixing" criminal charges. Id. at 726. Defendant claimed
that the prosecutor failed to present exculpatory evidence in the form of tax returns and canceled
checks to the- grand jury. Id. at 727. Page asserted that cheeks, which had been marked attorney's
fees, and income tax returns reflecting the payments as income from attorney's fees, tended to negate
his guilt. Id. at 728. The prosecution claimed, and the jury agreed, that the marked checks were
consistent with the theory that defendant was paid to fix cases under the guise of attorney's fees. IL
The court of appeals concluded that the evidence was not clearly exculpatory and held that the
prosecutor was not required to present such evidence to the grand jury. Id.
76. Id. at 727-28.
77. Id. at 728.
78. IL
79. Id
80. Id Although the Tenth Circuit held that a prosecutor must present substantial exculpatory
evidence to the grand jury, the court in Page found that the evidence at issue was not clearly
exculpatory. Id.
81. United States v. Larrazolo, 869 F.2d 1354, 1357 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. DeRosa,
783 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 477 U.S. 908 (1986); United States v. Chanen,
549 F.2d 1306, 1309 (9th Cir. 1977). Other remedies for prosecutorial misconduct have included
quashing subpoenas, suppressing grand jury testimony, granting injunctive relief, vacating contempt
citations, expunging prejudicial matter from indictments, and recommending disciplinary action
against the prosecutor. GERsHMAN, supra note 5, § 2.2, at 2-6, 2-7.
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fundamentally fair proceeding, an indictment was dismissed as
violative of due process.82 Courts used their supervisory power to
dismiss grand jury indictments as a prophylactic measure when the
prosecutor's misconduct was flagrant and extreme, even though no
constitutional rights were infringed. 3
C. Dismissing Grand Jury Indictments
Occasionally, federal courts concluded that an accused's
constitutional right to a fundamentally fair judicial proceeding had
been violated and dismissed an indictment or reversed a conviction
on Fifth Amendment due process grounds.14 Courts that dismissed
indictments for constitutional violations generally relied upon a line
of Supreme Court cases that recognized a prosecutor's duty to
ensure that a defendant received a fair trial.8 5 According to these
82. United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 785-86 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is violated when a defendant is required to stand trial on an
indictment which the prosecutor knows is based on perjured testimony that is material to the case);
see United States v. DeMarco, 401.F. Supp. 505, 512-13 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (holding that the
prosecutor violated the defendant's due process right by threatening to bring a new indictment in
order to deter the defendant from asserting statutory venue rights), aff'd on other grounds, 550 F.2d
1224 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 827 (1977); see also infra notes 84-87 and
accompanying text (discussing the constitutional right to a fundamentally fair proceeding).
83. United States v. Hogan, 712 F.2d 757,761-62 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that an indictment
based almost exclusively on hearsay evidence and inflammatory statements made by the prosecutor,
should be dismissed in order to preserve the grand jury's integrity as an independent body). See
generally Lisa H. Wallach, Comment, Prosecutorial Misconduct in the Grand Jury: Dismissal of
Indictments Pursuant to the Federal Supervisory Power, 56 FORDHAm L. REVIEW 129 (1987)
(discussing the use of supervisory power by lower federal courts to dismiss grand jury indictments
for prosecutorial misconduct).
84. Basurto, 497 F.2d at 787. In Basurto, the Ninth Circuit held that it was a denial of due
process for defendants to stand trial on an indictment that the government knew was based on
perjured testimony. Id at 785-86. Most courts, however, are reluctant to dismiss an indictment based
on perjured testimony unless the violation is clearly flagrant. See United States v. Richman, 600 F.2d
286, 292 (1st Cir. 1979) (holding that a prosecutor's negligent failure to recognize false testimony
was insufficient to dismiss the indictment); United States v. Cathey, 591 F.2d 268, 272-73 (5th Cir.
1979) (intimating that the use of perjured testimony does not automatically require dismissal of an
indictment); United States v. Kennedy, 564 F.2d 1329, 1338 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that an
indictment should only be dismissed in flagrant cases of knowing use of perjured testimony relating
to a material matter).
85. Basurto, 497 F.2d at 786 (stating that the prosecutor's duty to ensure; see Napue v.
Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 272 (1959) (holding that a prosecutor's knowing use of perjured testimony
violated the defendant's due process right to a fundamentally fair trial); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S.
28, 31 (1957) (holding that a prosecutor's failure to correct a witness's testimony, known by the
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courts, an accused was denied his right to a fair proceeding when
misconduct significantly infringed upon the grand jury's ability to
render an independent and unbiased judgment.86 Although courts
dismissed indictments as a remedy for constitutional violations that
occurred during grand jury proceedings, their treatment of
prosecutorial misconduct was inconsistentY
In United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,88 the Ninth Circuit
reviewed a district court's finding that a prosecutor had engaged in
misconduct during a grand jury proceeding.89 The prosecutor had
expressed personal views about the evidence, permitted a witness
to make inflammatory and prejudicial statements, failed to present
exculpatory evidence, and improperly issued subpoenas? The
prosector's misconduct, according to the district court, had
precluded the grand jury from making an impartial determination
of probable cause.9 The Ninth Circuit agreed that the prosecutor
had acted improperly, but held that the indictment should not be
dismissed.92 The majority stated that the prosecutor's misconduct
had not denied the defendant of a fair proceeding because the
grand jury was still able to make an unbiased determination.93
Despite the prosecutor's misconduct, other actions of the prosecutor
neutralized the prejudicial effect and reinforced the independence
prosecutor to be false, constituted a denial of defendant's due process rights); Mooney v. Holohan,
294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (stating that a prosecutor's use of false testimony would deny a defendant
his due process right to a fundamentally fair trial); see also supra note 57 (describing the elements
of a fundamentally fair trial).
86. United States v. Dorfman, 532 F. Supp. 1118, 1131-32 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
87. GERSHMAN, supra note 5, § 2.2(a), at 2.7. Compare United States v. Cathey, 591 F.2d
268, 272-73 (5th Cir. 1979) (intimating that a prosecutor's use of perjured testimony does not
automatically require dismissal) with United States v. Provenzano, 440 F. Supp. 561,565 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (holding that the knowing use of perjured testimony by the prosecutor during grand jury
proceedings violates due process).
88. 719 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1079 (1984).
89. Id. at 1389-90.
90. United States v. Sears, Roebuck& Co.,518 F. Supp. 179, 185-90 (C.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd,
719 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1983).
91. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 518 F. Supp. at 188-90.
92. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 719 F.2d at 1390-92.
93. Id, at 1391-92.
1741
Pacific Law Journal/ VoL 24
and objectivity of the grand jury.94 The Ninth Circuit concluded
that an indictment should be dismissed only when a grand jury fails
to act impartially.9" The majority noted that this is the only
instance when a defendant is denied a fundamentally fair
proceeding.
9 6
Other federal courts stated that dismissing grand jury
indictments was justified merely as a prophylactic measure.97
These courts invoked their inherent supervisory power to dismiss
indictments as a means of protecting judicial integrity and deterring
future misconduct.98 The Supreme Court stated that lower federal
courts had a duty to establish judicial standards that would
guarantee defendants a fair judicial proceeding.99 In United States
v. Hastings,"°° the Supreme Court concluded that federal courts
may use their supervisory powers to formulate procedural rules that
are not provided by the Constitution or Congress.' l The Court
94. Id at 1392. The court found that the prosecutor's statements to the grand jury that the
witness might be biased was a factor tending to permit the grand jury to evaluate objectively the
testimony. kd
95. Id at 1394.
96. Id The dissent argued that dismissal based on constitutional grounds is analytically distinct
from dismissal based on a court's supervisory power. Id (Norris, J., dissenting in part). The dissent
argued that the use of supervisory power is needed to maintain judicial integrity and to deter future
prosecutorial misconduct. Id The public has a primary interest in maintaining the fundamental values
of the judicial system. Id at 1395 (Norris, J., dissenting in part). The dissent concluded that a court
should have the right to invoke its supervisory powers to dismiss an indictment when dismissal is
necessary to maintain judicial integrity or to deter future prosecutorial misconduct. Id.
97. United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 817 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Birdman, 602
F.2d 547,559 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877, 884 (9th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Owen, 580 F.2d 365, 367 (9th Cir. 1978) (stating that courts use their supervisory power
to dismiss grand jury indictments as a prophylactic means for deterring future prosecutorial
misconduct).
98. Serubo, 604 F.2d at 817; see United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983);
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943) (stating that two purposes underlying the use
ofa court's supervisory power are to preserve judicial integrity and to deter illegal conduct); see also
Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory
Limits on the Authority ofthe Federal Courts, 84 COLUm. L. Rv. 1433, 1434 (1984) (discussing the
use of supervisory power in federal courts).
99. McNabb, 318 U.S. at 340.
100. 461 U.S. 499 (1983).
101. Id at 505. In Hastings, the Seventh Circuit used its supervisory power to reverse a
conviction based on a prosecutor's continued reference to a defendant's failure to testify at trial.
United States v. Hastings, 660 F.2d 301, 303 (7th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 461 U.S. 499 (1983); see Griffin
v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (holding that it was unconstitutional for a prosecutor to
comment to thejury that the defendant's refusal to testify was evidence of guilt). The Seventh Circuit
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offered three reasons to support a court's use of supervisory power
to reverse a conviction when prosecutorial misconduct has occurred
at trial."° First, reversal provides a remedy for individuals who
have had a legal right violated.0 3 Second, reversal ensures that
criminal convictions are attained in a legitimate manner.'" 4
Finally, reversal helps deter illegal conduct before the court.' 5
The Supreme Court, however, cautioned lower courts to consider
carefully any decision to reverse a conviction."e6 Courts must
balance all competing interests that are present in a criminal
prosecution. 0 7
Applying the Hastings court's analysis to grand jury
proceedings, federal courts have used their inherent supervisory
powers to dismiss grand jury indictments involving various forms
of prosecutorial misconduct.' 8 Courts have dismissed indictments
or reversed convictions where the prosecutor's conduct before the
grand jury was extremely prejudicial, 1" where the particular
had previously indicated that any prosecutorial reference to a defendant's failure to testify, would
result in per se reversal unless the jury was immediately advised of the error. See United States v.
Rodriquez, 627 F.2d 110, 112 (7th Cir. 1980) (stating that prosecutorial comments about a
defendant's silence at trial is a problem that continues to grow despite admonition by the court). The
Supreme Court concluded that the Seventh Circuit's decision to reverse was not based on prejudice
to the defendant, but was done for the purpose of punishing the prosecutor for improper conduct.
Hastings, 461 U.S. at 504-05. The Supreme Court applied the harmless error doctrine and reversed
the circuit court's decision. Id. at 510-12; see Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21-22 (1967)
(stating that a prosecutor's comment to the jury that the defendant's refusal to testify was evidence
of guilt was not subject to per se reversal but required a harmless error analysis before reversal was
proper). The Supreme Court held that lower federal courts may not assert their supervisory power
merely to justify reversing a criminal conviction. Hastings, 461 U.S. at 505.




106. Id. at 506-07.
107. I. at 507.
108. GERSHNLAN, supra note 5, § 2.2(b), at 2-10, 2-11 (listing various forms of prosecutorial
misconduct); see supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text (discussing prosecutorial misconduct
during grand jury proceedings).
109. See United States v. Hogan, 712 F.2d 757, 762 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Serubo,
604 F.2d 807, 818 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877, 882 (9th Cir. 1979)
(holding that dismissal of an indictment is warranted where the prosecutor's conduct indicates a
deliberate attempt to prejudice the grand jury).
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misconduct had become entrenched," where the result of the
misconduct was unequal treatment of the accused,"' or where
there was a need to formulate procedural rules governing proper
prosecutorial conduct."2  Although courts have dismissed
indictments for prosecutorial misconduct, the use of supervisory
power over grand jury proceedings has been limited for several
reasons. 113
First, the grand jury has traditionally functioned unrestricted by
rules of evidence and procedure." 4 Courts are generally unwilling
to require adherence to technical rules that could hinder the grand
jury's ability to investigate criminal activity."' Second, courts are
unwilling to impede or obstruct the grand jury's law enforcement
function by questioning the grand jury's conduct.116 The grand
jury's investigatory powers have proven to be of considerable
importance in prosecuting cases involving governmental corruption,
racketeering, and drug trafficking."' Third, the, general rule that
grand jury proceedings are secret has made courts reluctant to
110. See United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132, 1137 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that dismissal
of an indictment is proper to deter prosecutors' continual use of hearsay evidence during grand jury
proceedings).
11. See United States v. Jacobs, 531 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that where it is the
uniform practice of the prosecutor to advise a grand jury witness that he is the target of investigation,
failure to so advise the witness before he testifies, requires dismissing the indictment in order to
maintain uniformity in criminal procedure), vacated, 429 U.S. 909 (1976).
112. GERSHMAN, supra note 5, § 2.2(b), at 2-10,2-11; see United States v. Page, 808 F.2d 723,
727-28 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 918 (1987); United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d
616, 623 (2d Cir. 1979) (requiring federal prosecutors to disclose substantially exculpatory evidence
to the grand jury); see also Estepa, 471 F.2d at 1137 (holding that an indictment should be dismissed
for a prosecutor's continual and improper use of hearsay evidence before the grand jury). The rule
for dismissing an indictment based upon improper use of hearsay evidence during grand jury
proceedings has been summarized as follows: "[Ain indictment based on hearsay is invalid where
(1) non-hearsay evidence is readily available; (2) the grand jury is misled into believing it was
hearing direct testimony rather than hearsay; and (3) there is a high probability that had the grand
jury heard the eye witnesses it would not have indicted." United States v. Cruz, 478 F.2d 408, 410
(5th Cit. 1973).
113. 2 BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 1, § 10:18, at 62-63.
114. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974); see FED. R. EviD. l101(d)(2)
(providing that rules of evidence other than with respect to privileges do not apply to grand jury
proceedings).
115. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 343-44.
116. In re Grand Jury Investigation of Hugle, 754 F.2d 863, 864 (9th Cir. 1985).
117. 1 LAFAVE & IsRA.EL, supra note 2, § 8.3, at 610.
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interfere with the grand jury."' The majority of courts fear that
greater judicial supervision will lead to numerous collateral attacks
on grand jury indictments resulting in unnecessary delays of
criminal prosecutions." 9 Finally, federal courts may not use their
inherent supervisory power to dismiss a grand jury indictment
without first conducting a harmless error review. 2 '
D. The Harmless Error Rule
The Supreme Court has limited the ability of lower federal
courts to dismiss grand jury indictments by requiring a harmless
error analysis of the prosecutor's misconduct. 2' The harmless
error rule requires federal courts to disregard any defect or
irregularity in a criminal proceeding that does not directly prejudice
the defendant." Harmless error analysis requires a court to
consider the impact that prosecutorial misconduct had on a
particular proceeding. 23 The prosecutor's misconduct is harmless
error if it did not contribute to the grand jury's decision to
118. United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 424-25 (1983); see FED. R. CRIM. P.
6(e)(2) (prohibiting disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury under penalty of contempt).
The Supreme Court has stated that several important interests are preserved by insuring the secrecy
of grand jury proceedings. See Douglas Oil Co. of California v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S.
211, 218-19 (1979). First, witnesses are more likely to testify at grand jury proceedings if their
identities remain confidential. Id at 219. Second, persons under investigation are less likely to flee
or attempt to coerce and intimidate grand jurors if they are unaware that an investigation is
proceeding. Id Finally, the identity of persons accused but exonerated by the grand jury will remain
private. Id.
119. See Poulin, supra note 54, at 887 (stating that federal courts have been unwilling to
exercise their supervisory power and permit challenges to grand jury indictments).
120. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250,254-55 (1988) (holding that federal
courts may not dismiss an indictment or reverse a conviction unless the prosecutor's misconduct
substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to indict or rendered the trial fundamentally unfair).
For a general discussion of Supreme Court's treatment of the harmless error doctrine, see Tom Stacy
& Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 79 (1988); Martha
A. Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Error-A Process in Need of a
Rationale, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 15 (1976).
121. Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 254-55.
122. FED. R. CRtM. P. 52(a).
123. United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499,508-09 (1983); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.
18, 23 (1967); Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963) (stating that harmless error analysis
is concerned with whether a prosecutor's misconduct contributed to a conviction at trial).
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indict.' If a court finds that the misconduct was harmless error,
dismissal of the indictment is unwarranted. 12
5
In United States v. Mechanik, 16  the Supreme Court
considered whether permitting two government witnesses to jointly
testify in violation of Rule 6(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure required per se dismissal of an indictment. 7 The
Mechanik Court held that prosecutorial misconduct during grand
jury proceedings is rendered harmless error if the defendant is
subsequently convicted at trial. 2 ' The majority reasoned that
since a greater level of proof was required for a conviction than for
an indictment, the guilty verdict was sufficient to conclude that
there had been probable cause to indict.'29 Therefore, a new trial
should only be granted if the defendant was denied a fair
determination of guilt or innocence. 3 ' Unless the defendant can
show that the grand jury error deprived him of a fair trial, the
conviction should stand.13 '
Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion in which she
rejected the Court's view that the impact of prosecutorial
misconduct on a grand jury should be judged by the verdict at
trial.132 Justice O'Connor believed that the majority's approach
would undermine the grand jury's traditional function of protecting
the innocent from unwarranted prosecutions. 133 She thought that
124. Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 263-64.
125. id. at 255-56.
126. 475 U.S. 66 (1986).
127. IM at 67. In Mechanik, the defendant was indicted for conspiracy and several drug-related
charges. Id. The defendant learned that two Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents had
testified simultaneously before the grand jury. Id at 68. The defendant moved to dismiss the indict
for violation of Rule 6(d). Id The motion was denied and the defendant was found guilty. ICE The
court of appeals reversed the conspiracy conviction on the grounds that the plain language of Rule
6(d) required automatic reversal. M, at 69. Rule 6(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
states in part: "Attorneys for the government, the witness under examination, interpreters when
needed and, for the purpose of taking the evidence, a stenographer or operator of a recording device
may be present while the grand jury is in session, but no person other than the jurors may be present
while the grand jury is deliberating or voting." FED. R. CIRM. P. 6(d).
128. Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 72-73.
129. Md at 67.
130. Id at 72.
131. Id
132. Id at 73 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
133. Id
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misconduct before the grand jury should be examined in light of
the grand jury proceeding itself and not the trial.' Justice
O'Connor concluded that an indictment should be dismissed before
trial if it is determined that prosecutorial misconduct substantially
influenced the grand jury's decision to indict, or created a grave
doubt as to whether that was the effect.1 35 Although the Mechanik
Court did not agree with Justice O'Connor's position, a majority of
the Justices were subsequently persuaded by her approach.
Two years after deciding Mechanik, the Supreme Court
reviewed the dismissal of an indictment where prosecutorial
misconduct had not prejudiced the defendant. 136 In Bank of Nova
Scotia v. United States,13 7 the issue on appeal was whether a
court could invoke its supervisory power to dismiss an indictment
without first conducting a harmless error analysis. 38 The Court
held that an indictment may not be dismissed unless the defendant
can show that prosecutorial misconduct influenced the grand jury's
decision to indict. 39 Federal courts must conduct a harmless error
inquiry to determine if the defendant was actually prejudiced by the
prosecutor's conduct. 4 The majority stated that the harmless
error test for dismissal of an indictment is whether the misconduct
"substantially influenced" the grand jury's decision to indict.'4'
This substantial influence test is the same standard for dismissal
that Justice O'Connor advocated in her Mechanik concurrence. 142
The Bank of Nova Scotia Court found that none of the alleged
134. Id. at 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
135. Id at 78 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
136. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 252 (1988).
137. 487 U.S. 250 (1988).
138. Id at 252. In Bank of Nova Scotia, the district court exercised supervisory power over the
grand jury process by dismissing indictments on twenty-six counts of tax and mail fraud and
obstruction of justice following a hearing on alleged grand jury abuses by the prosecutor in violation
of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and 18
U.S.C. §§ 6002, 6003. Id. at 252-53.
139. Id at 263-64.
140. Id. at 263
141. Id. at 256.
142. Id; see United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 78 (1986) (O'Connor, I., concurring)
(stating that an indictment should be dismissed if the prosecutor's conduct substantially influenced
the grand jury's decision to indict); see also supra notes 126-135 and accompanying text (discussing
the Supreme Court's holding in Mechanik).
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prosecutorial misconduct had substantially influenced the grand
jury's decision to indict. 143 Therefore, the district court had
exceeded its supervisory power by dismissing the indictment before
trial.'"
Four years after the Bank of Nova Scotia decision, the Supreme
Court again considered the extent to which lower federal courts
could dismiss a grand jury indictment for prosecutorial misconduct.
In United States v. Williams, the Court considered whether lower
federal courts could invoke their inherent supervisory power to
require a prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence to the grand
jury.14 5
II. THE CASE
A. The Factual and Procedural History
Respondent John H. Williams, Jr., a Tulsa, Oklahoma
businessman, was indicted by a federal grand jury for allegedly
defrauding four Oklahoma banks in violation of federal law.'1
6
Williams was charged with seven counts of knowingly making a
false statement or report for the purpose of influencing the action
143. Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 263-64.
144. Id at 263-64. The Supreme Court held that using supervisory power to dismiss an
indictment violates the harmless error standard of rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. ld at 254-55; see FED. R. CRM. P. 52(a) (providing that errors not affecting substantive
rights shall be disregarded). The majority in Bank of Nova Scotia noted that there may be cases in
which indictments could be dismissed without assessing the prejudicial impact on the grand jury.
Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 256. The Court explained that these cases would be ones in which
the structural protection of the grand jury has been so compromised as to render the proceedings
fundamentally unfair, allowing a presumption of prejudice. Id at 257.
145. 112 S. Ct. 1735 (1992).
146. Id at 1737. Williams was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1014 which states in part:
Whoever knowingly makes any false statement or report, or willfully overvalues any land,
property or security, for the purpose of influencing in any way the action of... any
institution the accounts of which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation .. .upon any application, . . . or loan, or any change or extension of any of
the same .... shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30
years or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1989).
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of a federally insured financial institution.47 The indictment
alleged that Williams had willfully overvalued his current assets to
obtain approval and renewal of various bank loans.148
Between September 1984 and November 1985, Williams
obtained loans from four Tulsa banks.'49 With each loan request,
Williams presented the banks with two types of financial
statements disclosing his current financial position.15 The first
type of financial disclosure was a "Market Value Balance Sheet"
which contained a category of assets called "current assets. 15 1
Under this category, Williams listed notes receivable worth
approximately $6 million that were due from three venture capital
companies in which he had invested.'52 The second type of
financial disclosure was a "Statement of Projected Income and
Expenses." '53 On this statement Williams listed the interest
payable on the above mentioned notes receivable as an income
source.154 The government claimed that classifying the notes
receivable as current assets was misleading because Williams knew
that none of the venture companies could afford to satisfy the notes
in the short term.155 The government also claimed that the
income statement was misleading because interest accruing on the
147. Williams, 112 S. C. at 1737; see United States v. Smith, 838 F.2d 436,439-40 (10th Cir.
1988); United States v. Bonnette, 663 F.2d 495, 497 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 951
(1982) (specifying the essential elements that the government must prove in order to obtain a
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1014). The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that:
(1) The defendant made a false statement to a bank; (2) that his purpose was to influence the bank's
action; (3) that a material fact was falsely stated; and (4) that the defendant knew the statement was
false. Bonnette, 663 F.2d at 497.
148. United States v. Williams, 899 F.2d 898, 899 (10th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1735
(1992).
149. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1731.
150. Id. at 1737.
151. Id. The term "current assets" is commonly used to describe assets that will be realized in
cash within one year. Williams, 899 F.2d at 899.
152. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1737.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id The companies issuing the notes were relatively new and each had a negative net
worth. Williams, 899 F.2d at 899. The balance sheet contained a disclaimer that the notes receivable
were carried at cost rather than market value, but the government maintained that the statement was
misleading because Williams knew that none of the venture companies could satisfy the notes in the
short term. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1737.
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notes was due from venture companies owned by Williams.'56
Thus, banks were likely to believe that Williams was receiving
interest income from an independent outside source.'57
After a six month grand jury investigation, Williams was
indicted for defrauding a federally insured financial institution.'58
Following arraignment, the district court granted Williams' motion
to compel disclosure of all exculpatory evidence within the
government's possession.'59 The government agreed to provide
Williams with edited portions of the grand jury transcript, and to
submit the unedited transcript to the court.' After reviewing the
grand jury transcript, Williams requested that the indictment be
dismissed because the prosecution had failed to present substantial
exculpatory evidence to the grand jury as required by the Tenth
Circuit's disclosure rule.161
The Tenth Circuit required a prosecutor to disclose to the grand
jury any substantially exculpatory evidence discovered during the
156. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1737.
157. Id.
158. Williams, 899 F.2d at 899.
159. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1737. Federal prosecutors are legally obligated under certain
circumstances to disclose evidence to a defendant for his use at trial. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a); Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (requiring the prosecutor, upon defendant's request, to disclose
evidence within the prosecutor's control that is material to the defendant's case); see United States
v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (defining evidence as material when there is a reasonable
probability that disclosing the evidence to the defense would result in a different outcome at trial).
The Supreme Court has held that a prosecutor must disclose known exculpatory evidence that raises
a reasonable doubt concerning the defendant's guilt. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976).
The Court has also held that a defendant is denied due process when a prosecutor withholds evidence
that would tend to exculpate a defendant or reduce the criminal penalty. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. A
prosecutor cannot deprive a defendant of his liberty by deliberately deceiving the court and jury about
the defendant's guilt. Id. at 86. The Supreme Court has stated that when evidence is so clearly
exculpatory that fairness mandates disclosure, the prosecutor has a duty to present such evidence.
Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112. However, a defendant's right to discovery is limited by the Jenks Act. 18
U.S.C. § 3500 (1989); see id. § 3500(e)(3) (limiting pretrial discovery of statements by government
witnesses before a grand jury). Congress passed the Jenks Act in response to the Supreme Court's
opinion in Jenks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). S. RP. No. 981, 85th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1861, 1862. Congress wished to insure that courts would not
construe Jenks to allow a defendant to broadly search government files for impeachment evidence.
Id; see Jenks, 353 U.S. at 668 (holding that a defendant was entitled to inspect all written F.B.I.
reports bearing on testimony by government witnesses at trial).
160. Williams, 899 F.2d at 899.
161. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1737.
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course of an investigation. 62 Williams argued that the prosecutor
did not present financial records and personal testimony which
tended to show that Williams had regularly accounted for the notes
receivable and interest income in a manner consistent with the
financial statements provided to the banks. 63 According to
Williams, this consistency in the reporting of his financial position
negated an intent to mislead and defraud the banks.' 4 Williams
contended that had the prosecution disclosed this exculpatory
evidence, the government would have been unable to establish an
essential element of the charged offense. 65 Therefore, the
prosecution's withholding of the financial records and personal
testimony had substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to
indict.16'
The district court initially rejected Williams' contention that the
government had withheld substantial exculpatory evidence from the
grand jury and refused to dismiss the indictment. 67 Williams
then moved for reconsideration of his motion to dismiss.'
Subsequently, the district court found that the government had
withheld substantial exculpatory evidence which created a
reasonable doubt concerning Williams' guilt. 69 The district court
then ordered the indictment dismissed without prejudice. 7 ' The
court of appeals affirmed, finding that the district court's holding
162. United States v. Page, 808 F.2d 723, 728 (10th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 482 U.S. 918
(1987); see supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text (discussing the Tenth Circuit's holding in
Page).
163. Wiliams, 112 S. Ct. at 1737-38. The government had subpoenaed fimancial records and
a five volume deposition that Williams had given during an earlier bankruptcy proceeding. Wl/iams,
899 F.2d at 900. Williams claimed that the deposition contained explanations of his accounting
methods that would have exonerated him before the grand jury. Ld.





169. IL The district court applied the substantial influence test articulated by the Supreme
Court in Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. 250 (1988) and concluded that the excluded evidence raised
a reasonable doubt about whether Williams knowingly sought to defraud the banks. Williams, 899
F.2d at 903.
170. Id. at 904.
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was neither an abuse of discretion nor clearly erroneous.1 7' The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether
an indictment may be dismissed for a prosecutor's failure to
present the grand jury with exculpatory evidence.'72
B. The Majority Opinion
Justice Scalia, writing for a five member majority of the United
States Supreme Court,173 reversed the Tenth Circuit's holding that
a prosecutor's failure to present substantial exculpatory evidence to
a grand jury required dismissal of an otherwise valid
indictment.174 In reaching its decision, the Williams majority
noted that neither the Fifth Amendment nor federal statute required
a prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence during indictment
proceedings. 75 The grand jury's status as an independent body
precludes federal courts from independently exercising supervisory
power over grand jury proceedings. 176  Therefore, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals had exceeded its authority by requiring
the prosecutor to disclose substantial exculpatory evidence to the
grand jury. 177
The majority began by addressing Williams' argument that the
Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Hastings78
permitted the Tenth Circuit to create a rule requiring the prosecutor
171. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1738.
172. Id
173. Justice Scalia's majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White, Kennedy and Souter. Id. at 1737. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices
Blackanun and O'Connor joined, and in Parts II and I of which Justice Thomas joined. Id at 1746-
54 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
174. L at 1746.
175. Id at 1741-42. In Costello, the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment requires
nothing more than an indictment returned by an unbiased grand jury. Costello v. United States, 350
U.S. 361, 363 (1956). The Court concluded that the sufficiency and competency of the evidence
relied upon by the grand jury is not subject to review by the courts. Id at 364; see supra notes 31-38
and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's holding in Costello).
176. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1742.
177. Id at 1746.
178. 461 U.S. 499 (1983).
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to disclose exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.179 The Court
rejected Williams' claim that Hastings was broad enough to allow
federal courts to use their supervisory power to make rules for the
grand jury.18 The majority stated that the grand jury is an
independent institution over which the courts do not preside.'
A court's ability to create procedural rules is limited to exercising
supervisory power over its own judicial proceedings.182 Courts
may invoke their supervisory power to protect the substantive and
procedural rights of an accused during trial.18 3 However, a court
may not use its supervisory power to formulate rules for the grand
jury. 184 The Williams majority stressed that a court's supervisory
power is limited to dismissing a grand jury indictment only when
a prosecutor has committed misconduct that violates a rule
specifically created by the Supreme Court or Congress to ensure
the integrity of grand jury proceedings. 185
The majority stated that the grand jury is a separate
constitutional institution.18 6 The grand jury's historic function as
a protector of citizens requires that it remain independent of both
the prosecutor and the court. 8 7 Although the grand jury often
appears to be part of the judiciary, a court's involvement with the
grand jury is very limited.18  The grand jury's independence has
179. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1741. The Supreme Court stated in Hastings that federal courts
may formulate limited procedural rules in addition to those specifically required by the constitution
or federal statute. Hastings, 461 U.S. at 505; see supra notes 100-107 and accompanying text
(discussing the Supreme Court's holding in Hastings).
180. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1741.
181. Ict at 1742.
182. Md.; see Jenks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 667-68 (1957) (stating that federal courts
may create procedural rules to govern court proceedings); see also Mesarosh v. United States, 352
U.S. 1, 9-14 (1956) (holding that a federal court may formulate rules to improve the truth finding
process during trial).
183. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1741.
184. Id. at 1742.
185. IX. at 1741.
186. Id. at 1742. The grand jury is not mentioned in the body of the Constitution and is,
therefore, not assigned to any of the three constitutional branches of government. le.
187. IM.
188. Id. Justice Scalia stated that judges have generally been limited to calling the grand jurors
together and administering their oaths of office. Id; see United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,343
(1974) (describing the role of federal courts in the grand jury process); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(a)
(empowering federal courts to summon a grand jury and appoint grand jurors).
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allowed it to function unhindered by the technical rules applicable
to trials." 9 The Williams Court concluded that the grand jury's
functional independence would be compromised by allowing courts
to impose procedural rules on indictment proceedings. 9 '
The majority next addressed Williams' argument that judicial
supervision was necessary to ensure that the grand jury remain
independent and informed.'91 Williams contended that judicial
supervision would enhance the grand jury's historical function of
indicting the justly accused and protecting the innocent from
unfounded prosecutions." The majority responded that requiring
the prosecutor to present both exculpatory and inculpatory evidence
would actually alter the grand jury's traditional function.'93
Throughout history it was thought sufficient for the grand jury to
hear only evidence on behalf of the prosecutor.' 94 The rationale
being that an indictment is not a final adjudication but merely a
preliminary accusation that must be tried before a court.' 95 A rule
requiring the prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence would
transform the grand jury into an adjudicatory body.'96 Therefore,
189. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1743; see Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 364 (1956)
(refusing to enforce the hearsay rule in grand jury proceeding because the grand jury has historically
been conducted without technical rules). The majority noted that certain constitutional protection
guaranteed to defendants during criminal proceedings do not apply to the grand jury. Williams, 112
S. Ct. at 1743. For example, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not bar a
grand jury from returning an indictment when a prior grand jury has refused to indict. Id,; see Ev
parte United States, 287 U.S. 241, 250-51 (1932) (holding that the power of the grand jury to indict
is original and complete and not limited by any action taken by a previous grand jury). The Sixth
Amendment right to counsel does not attach when an individual is summoned to appear before a
grand jury. Wi!iams, 112 S. CL at 1743; see United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581 (1976)
(stating that persons summoned to appear before the grand jury may not insist upon legal
representation, even if he is the subject of the investigation). The Fifth Amendment privilege against
self incrimination does not prevent the grand jury from considering evidence previously obtained in
violation of the Fifth Amendment. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1743; see Calandra, 414 U.S. at 346
(stating that evidence obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination may form the basis for a grand jury indictment).
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the grand jury's historical function would not be preserved by
allowing judicial supervision of the indictment process.197
Finally, the Williams Court stated that indictments are not open
to challenges based on the sufficiency of evidence presented to the
grand jury. 9 ' The majority reasoned that it would be inconsistent
to review the adequacy of the prosecutor's presentation, yet refuse
to review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
indictment.' 9 The majority pointed out that grand juries can
choose not to hear evidence presented by the prosecutor if enough
evidence has been presented to return a valid indictment.2"
Because the grand jury has no obligation to hear all substantial
exculpatory evidence, the majority reasoned that a prosecutor
should have no obligation to present such evidence.20'
If the sufficiency or competency of the evidence supporting an
indictment were reviewable, every indictment could be challenged
on evidentiary grounds.2' Defendants could claim that the
prosecutor had presented incomplete or misleading evidence to the
grand jury.203 The Williams majority found no reason to require
a prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.2
Therefore, the majority concluded that federal courts may not
invoke their inherent supervisory power to dismiss an otherwise
valid indictment when a prosecutor fails to present exculpatory
evidence during grand jury proceedings.0 5
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1745. The majority cited Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363-64 (1956),
where the Supreme Court stated that historically grand jury indictments were considered valid when
based on incomplete or inadequate evidence. Id. at 1746; see United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia,
487 U.S. 250,261 (1988) (holding that the reliability or competency of the evidence presented to the
grand jury is an insufficient basis to challenge an indictment); see also supra 136-144 notes and
accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's holding in Bank of Nova Scotia).
199. Williams, 112 S. CL at 1746.
200. Id. at 1745.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1746.
203. Id.
204. IAL at 1745-46.
205. Id. at 1746.
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C. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices
Blackmun and O'Connor.2° The dissent disagreed with the
majority's holding that federal courts may not use their supervisory
power to require prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence to the
grand jury.2"7 The dissent argued that prosecutors have a duty to
ensure fundamental fairness and that courts have the power to
make rules governing grand jury proceedings."'
The dissent in Williams began by arguing that the prosecutor's
duty to refrain from misconduct during judicial proceedings applies
equally to the grand jury.'" The dissent identified a number of
instances where prosecutors have engaged in fundamentally unfair
tactics in both judicial and grand jury proceedings.210 The
knowing use of perjured testimony, the suppression of evidence
favorable to an accused person, and misstatements of the law to the
jury, were cited as examples of prosecutorial misconduct which
may occur at trial.21' The dissent also cited examples of
prosecutorial misconduct which may occur before the grand jury as
including the use of perjured testimony, failing to inform the grand
jury about the existence of exculpatory evidence, and misstating the
facts on cross-examination of a witness.2" The dissent argued
that a prosecutor's obligation to ensure justice is especially
important when presenting evidence to the grand jury.213 The
prosecutor's ability to control a grand jury proceeding creates the
opportunity for misconduct.214 The ex parte character of the
grand jury allows the prosecutor to operate unchecked by a judge
206. Id. at 1746-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas joined in Parts II and Ill of the
dissenting opinion. Id
207. Id. at 1751-52 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
208. Id




213. Id at 1750 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
214. Id
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or a legal adversary.215 Thus, the prosecutor's unique relationship
with the grand jury imposes an ethical duty on the prosecutor to
refrain from misconduct that would result in a wrongful
indictment.216 The dissent contended that since the potential for
misconduct is so great, the judiciary is obligated to protect the
integrity of grand jury proceedings.217
The dissent next attacked the majority's narrow view of a
court's ability to dismiss grand jury indictments.218 The dissent
stated that the Court has applied the same harmless error rule to the
grand jury that has been applied to trial proceedings.219 The
standard for dismissing a grand jury indictment was established in
Bank of Nova Scotia.' The test for harmless error is whether a
prosecutor's misconduct played a critical role in persuading the
grand jury to indict.22' The plain implication of that holding,
according to the dissent, was to permit dismissal even though the
specific misconduct was not expressly forbidden by an established
rule.222 Therefore, any prosecutorial misconduct which prevents
the grand jury from returning an unbiased indictment, provides
grounds for dismissal.2z
215. Id
216. l The dissent cited Justice Sutherland in Bergerv. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935),
who said that the federal prosecutor acts as the sovereign's representative. Id Because the sovereign
must govern impartially, its interest in a criminal prosecution is not to win a case but to see that
justice is done. Id.
217. Id. The dissent cited United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1979), for the
proposition that while in theory a trial provides the defendant with a full opportunity to challenge and
disprove the charges against him, in practice, the issuance of an indictment will often have a
devastating personal and professional effect that a subsequent dismissal or acquittal can never
eliminate. Id
218. ld at 1751 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
219. Id Justice Stevens cited the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Mechanik, 475
U.S. 66, 71-72 (1986), that the harmless error rule is equally applicable to grand jury proceedings
and trials. Id
220. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1751 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
221. Id
222. Id In fact, Justice Stevens pointed out that the Supreme Court applied the same standard
to a prosecutor's violation of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and to violations of the duty
to ensure fundamentally fair judicial proceedings. Id
223. Id.
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Fiially, the dissent rejected the majority's contention that the
grand jury is a completely autonomous body.224 Despite the grand
jury's ability to conduct independent investigations, the grand jury
must rely upon the court's authority to effectively investigate
criminal activities.' The grand jury operates unrestricted by
technical rules only because Congress and the Supreme Court have
thought it best not to impose such restraints on the grand jury.226
Federal courts have the authority through their inherent supervisory
power to create and enforce limited rules governing grand jury
proceedings.227 Courts may invoke their supervisory power when
necessary to protect the integrity of the grand jury.228 The dissent
reasoned that the grand jury's historic function as a protector of
citizens is not served by ignoring prosecutorial misconduct. 229
The dissent would not require a prosecutor to present all
potentially exculpatory evidence to a grand jury.230 Requiring the
prosecutor to search for evidence that could create a reasonable
doubt concerning a defendant's guilt would be inconsistent with the
purpose of the grand jury." The prosecutor's obligation to
disclose exculpatory evidence should be limited to substantial
exculpatory evidence that is discovered during the course of a
grand jury investigation.232 The dissent concluded that the
prosecutor may not mislead the grand jury into believing that there
224. Id. at 1752 (Stevens, L, dissenting).
225. Id
226. Id Justice Stevens stated that the majority conceded this point when it said that Congress
was free to prescribe a rule requiring the prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence to the grand
jury. Id at 1752, n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
227. Id at 1752 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
228. Id at 1753 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 1754 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
232. Id The dissent cited the Department of Justice's internal policy manual as the standard
for when exculpatory evidence should be disclosed to a grand jury. Id The Department of Justice
requires a prosecutor who is personally aware of substantial evidence directly negating a suspect's
guilt to present or otherwise disclose such evidence to the grand jury. ATrORNEYS' MANuAL, supra
note 68, 9-11.233. But see United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 753-54 (1979) (stating that a
violation of Department of Justice internal policy is not a grounds for dismissal).
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is probable cause to indict by withholding substantial exculpatory
evidence.2 33
IR. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
The decision in United States v. Williams resolved a conflict
that existed between lower federal courts by holding that a court's
inherent supervisory power may not be used to make a rule
requiring prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence to the grand
jury.34 In order to reach the conclusion in Williams, the Supreme
Court distinguished earlier cases involving the extent of a federal
court's supervisory power over the grand jury process.235 The
Court reviewed the grand jury's historical role as an independent
body and concluded that federal courts are limited in their ability
to create procedural rules for the grand jury.2 36 The Williams
decision effectively precludes lower federal courts from providing
a remedy for many forms of prosecutorial misconduct that occur
during grand jury proceedings.2 37 As a result, the Court's decision
in Williams has the effect of legitimizing the prosecutor's
dominance over the indictment process and calls into question the
grand jury's ability to perform its historic function as a shield
against wrongful prosecutions." 8
233. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1754 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
234. See supra notes 173-205 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's holding
in Williams).
235. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1741-42; see infra notes 239-258 and accompanying text
(discussing the Williams majority's clarification of the Supreme Court's holding in United States v.
Hastings and Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States); see also supra notes 84-120 and accompanying
text (discussing the use of supervisory power); supra notes 121-145 and accompanying text
(discussing the harmless error rule).
236. See supra notes 178-190 and accompanying text (discussing and concluding that the
proper functioning of the grand jury requires that it remain independent of the court and free from
procedural rules).
237. See infra notes 254-258 and accompanying text (discussing the effect that the Williams
decision will have on a federal court's ability to remedy prosecutorial misconduct).
238. See Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1753 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court cannot
ignore unrestrained prosecutorial misconduct if the integrity and independence of the grand jury are
to be preserved); see also infra notes 259-274 and accompanying text (arguing that the Williams
decision hinders the grand jury's ability to prevent unfounded prosecutions).
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A. Limiting a Court's Supervisory Power
A primary concern of the Williams majority was that the grand
jury's functional independence would be compromised if lower
federal courts were permitted to use their inherent supervisory
power to make procedural rules governing grand jury
proceedings."' The majority emphasized that the grand jury is a
separate institution over which the courts do not preside.2 40 The
Court drew a distinction between the use of supervisory power to
govern trial proceedings and a court's power to supervise the grand
jury.141 The use of supervisory power to formulate procedural
rules for trial proceedings is necessary to improve and preserve the
truth finding process.242 Moreover, supervisory power may be
used to prevent parties from benefitting from violations of
substantive or procedural rules governing matters apart from the
trial itself.2 43 A court's use of inherent supervisory power outside
of trial proceedings, however, is limited to enforcing rules
specifically imposed by the Constitution or Congress.244 Thus,
federal courts may not use their supervisory power to
independently fashion procedural rules for the grand jury.245
Prior to the Williams decision, the Supreme Court had limited
a federal court's ability to dismiss grand jury indictments by
requiring courts to conduct a harmless error analysis.2 46 The
majority opinion in Williams further limits a court's ability to
239. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1744.
240. Id. at 1742.
241. Id. at 1741; see supra notes 84-120 and accompanying text (discussing the use of
supervisory power over federal judicial proceedings).
242. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1741.
243. I
244. ld
245. Id at 1744. The dissent took exception to the majority's insistence that the grand jury is
beyond the control of the courts. Id at 1752 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent claimed that the
grand jury operates unrestricted by procedural rules not because the Court lacks power to make rules
governing grand jury proceedings, but because the Court and Congress have chosen not to impose
restrictions on the grand jury. Id
246. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States 487 U.S. 250, 254-55 (1988); see supra notes 136-
144 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's holding in Bank of Nova Scotia); see
also supra notes 121-145 and accompanying text (discussing the harmless error rule).
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dismiss a grand jury indictment by requiring lower courts to find
that the prosecutor had violated a clearly established rule governing
grand jury proceedings.247 The Williams majority stated that the
Court's holding in Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States24
precluded lower federal courts from dismissing indictments for
prosecutorial misconduct unless the misconduct amounted to a
violation of a clearly defined rule established by Congress to
ensure the integrity of the grand jury process. 49
Although the alleged misconduct in Bank of Nova Scotia
involved a prosecutor's violation of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the Court's opinion did not expressly limit the range of
misconduct that would justify dismissing an indictment.250 The
Court's opinion in Bank of Nova Scotia required lower federal
courts to find only that the prosecutor's misconduct had
substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to indict. 1'
According to the dissent in Williams, however, the Court's holding
in Bank of Nova Scotia was not limited solely to dismissing
indictments for misconduct that amounted to violations of written
procedural rules.z 2 The dissent stated that the Court's holding in
Bank of Nova Scotia was broad enough to permit lower federal
courts to invoke their supervisory power and dismiss an indictment
for any form of misconduct that substantially influenced the grand
jury's decision to indict. 3
The Williams decision implies that a prosecutor's behavior
before the grand jury is not misconduct unless it violates a
constitutional provision or a procedural rule expressly applicable to
the grand jury.254 Since federal courts are prohibited from using
247. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1742.
248. See supra notes 136-144 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's holding
in Bank of Nova Scotia).
249. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1741.
250. See Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. 250,263 (1988) (holding only that lower courts must
find that the prosecutor's misconduct was not harmless error).
251. Id
252. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1751 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see supra notes 206-233 and
accompanying text (discussing the dissenting opinion in Williams).
253. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1751 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
254. See id. at 1743-44 (describing constitutional protections guaranteed to a defendant at trial
that are inapplicable to the grand jury and do not justify dismissing an otherwise valid indictment).
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their supervisory power to formulate rules governing grand jury
proceedings, the range of misconduct that may warrant dismissal
is extremely limited." Federal courts will no longer be justified
in dismissing an indictment merely because the prosecutor's
conduct had substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to
indict. 6 Courts will be required to find that the prosecutor's
conduct had violated one of the few rules created by Congress to
ensure the integrity of the grand jury." As a result, lower federal
courts are virtually powerless to remedy abuses of the grand jury
process because many forms of prosecutorial misconduct are not
expressly prohibited by procedural rules applicable to the grand
jury258
B. Limiting the Grand Jury's Screening Function
The majority in Williams was also concerned that the grand
jury would be transformed into an adjudicatory body if prosecutors
were required to present exculpatory evidence during indictment
proceedingsY 9 The Court emphasized that the grand jury does
not determine the guilt or innocence of an accused but merely
decides whether there is probable cause to believe that a crime has
been committed.2" The majority stated that any rule requiring the
prosecutor to present evidence favorable to an accused was
incompatible with the entire history of the grand jury.26'
255. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d) (limiting the persons who may be present during grand jury
proceedings); id. 6(e) (placing strict controls on disclosure of matters occurring before the grand
jury); 18 U.S.C. § 1622 (1989) (criminalizing subornation of perjury); id. § 1623 (1989)
(criminalizing false statements before the grand jury); id. § 2515 (1989) (prohibiting the use of
unlawfully intercepted wire ororal communications); id. §§ 6002,6003 (1989) (specifying procedures
for granting a witness immunity from prosecution).
256. See Wiiams, 112 S. Ct. at 1741-42 (stating that a court's use of supervisory power
outside of a trial proceeding is limited to enforcing legally compelled standards of prosecutorial
conduct).
257. Id.; see supra note 255 (listing the few rules created by congress to ensure the integrity
of the grand jury's function).
258. See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text (discussing several forms of prosecutorial
misconduct that have occurred before the grand jury).
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However, imposing a duty on the prosecutor to disclose substantial
exculpatory evidence actually facilitates the grand jury's ability to
successfully screen out unfounded accusations.262 Advising the
grand jury of evidence that substantially negates a suspect's guilt
permits the grand jury to serve its function as a protector against
wrongful prosecution. 6 3
Federal courts that had previously required the prosecutor to
disclose exculpatory evidence to the grand jury did not require the
prosecutor to actively search for evidence favorable to an
accused.2" These courts merely required the prosecutor to present
any substantial exculpatory evidence that was discovered during the
course of an investigation.265 A rule requiring the prosecutor to
disclose substantial exculpatory evidence is nothing more than a
prohibition against the prosecutor knowingly allowing a person to
be wrongfully indicted. 266
The majority's holding that lower federal courts may not create
a rule requiring the prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence to
the grand jury fails to recognize or appreciate the potential for a
prosecutor to abuse the indictment process.26 7 The majority takes
262. See United States v. Dorfman, 532 F. Supp. 1118, 1131-33 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (stating that
the grand jury's screening function would be subverted if the prosecutor was allowed to withhold
probative exculpatory evidence); United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 435 F. Supp. 610, 618
(N.D. Okla. 1977) (stating that the grand jury's ability to accurately determine the basis for an
indictment is dependent upon apprising the grand jury of all essential information).
263. See United States v. Page, 808 F.2d 723,728 (10th Cir. 1987) (describing the unlikelihood
of obtaining a conviction at trial when a fully informed grand jury could not find probable cause to
indict), cert denied, 482 U.S. 918 (1987).
264. Id.; United States v. Flomenhoft, 714 F.2d 708,712 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1068 (1984); Dorfinan, 532 F. Supp. at 1131.
265. Page, 808 F.2d at 728; Flomenhoft, 714 F.2d at 712.
266. See Dorfinan, 532 F. Supp. at 1131 (stating that a rule requiring the prosecutor to disclose
clearly exculpatory evidence to the grand jury is needed to balance the prosecutor's power and
prevent the injustice of a wrongful prosecution); see also Wallach, supra note 83, at 149-50
(concluding that judicial supervision over the grand jury is necessary to protect a defendant's rights).
267. See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text (discussing prosecutorial misconduct before
the grand jury); see also Arenella, supra note 2, at 504-05; Johnston, supra note 3, at 161 (describing
the prosecutor's ability to manipulate and misuse the grand jury). One commentator has argued that
prosecutors can misuse the indictment process by inducing an accused to enter into a plea bargain
agreement. Arenella, supra note 2, at 504-05. Prosecutors may choose to seek an indictment even
though the admissible evidence supporting a criminal charge is insufficient to sustain a conviction
at trial. Id. Since the grand jury is an ex parte proceeding in which the rules of evidence do not
apply, the standard for obtaining an indictment is lower than a conviction. Id. The threat of a criminal
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solace in the fact that indictments are merely preliminary
accusations and that an accused will be afforded a full range of
legal rights at trial.268 Although in theory a trial will permit a
defendant to contest the government's accusations, in most criminal
prosecutions the defendant never reaches the trial stage.269
Moreover, the stigma of a criminal indictment may be impossible
to eliminate even when the charges are subsequently dropped or the
defendant is acquitted.20 For those individuals whose livelihoods
depend upon their reputation, an indictment can have devastating
personal and professional consequences. 27 Because grand jury
indictments carry many of the same ramifications as an
adjudication on the merits, it seems clear that the factual basis for
believing that an individual has committed a crime should be well
founded.
The practical effect of the Williams decision is to give federal
prosecutors even greater control over the grand jury indictment
process. Since lower federal courts may not formulate rules to
regulate the prosecutor's behavior before the grand jury, federal
prosecutors are free to engage in many forms of misconduct
without fearing judicial repercussions.27 2 Such misconduct could
easily result in the indictment of otherwise innocent persons by
overzealous prosecutors attempting to satisfy their own sense of
trial may be sufficient to induce an accused to plead guilty to a lesser criminal offense. Id. By
employing this tactic, the prosecutor is able to obtain a guilty plea that is premised on a legally
unsupportable accusation. Id. See generally ATroRNLYS' MANuAL, supra note 68, 9-27.220
(specifying that federal prosecutors should not initiate a criminal prosecution unless there is sufficient
admissible evidence to support the conclusion that a suspect will probably be convicted).
268. See United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735,1744-45 (1992) (stating that an indictment
is only an accusation and not a final determination as to the guilt or innocence of an individual); see
also Arenella, supra note 2, at 487-98 (discussing the Supreme Court's assumption that trials
adequately protect defendants from determinations of legal guilt).
269. See Arenella, supra note 2, at 522 (stating that most defendants do not reach the trial stage
of a criminal prosecution).
270. United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807,817 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453,458-
59 (2d Cir. 1947) (Frank, J., concurring).
271. See Fried, 161 F.2d at 458-59 (stating that the public is likely to remember the accusation
and continue to suspect the individual of criminal conduct).
272. See supra notes 239-258 and accompanying text (discussing the inability of federal courts
to supervise the prosecutor's conduct before the grand jury after the Williams decision).
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justice." The Court's decision in Williams merely reinforces the
criticism that the grand jury is not an independent body but a tool
of the prosecutor."'
C. An Ethical Problem for the Prosecutor--Implications for the
Defense Attorney
Prior to the Williams decision, white-collar criminal defense
attorneys had to consider whether to advise the prosecutor of the
existence of exculpatory evidence during the investigative stage of
an indictment proceeding.2 75 In jurisdictions that required a
prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, the
defense attorney could find that presenting exculpatory evidence to
the prosecutor would promote the best interests of a client.
276
Although the defense attorney ran the risk of disclosing to the
prosecution important elements of a potential trial defense, there
were countervailing benefits which made disclosure potentially
beneficial. First, providing the prosecutor with exculpatory
evidence at the investigative stage might persuade the prosecutor
not to seek an indictment.2" The prosecutor could decide that the
case against an accused is insufficient to support a conviction at
trial and drop the investigation.27 Second, there might be a
possibility that the grand jury would not indict in light of the
273. See supra note 267 (discussing the prosecutor's use of the indictment process to obtain
plea bargains).
274. See Campbell, supra note 3, at 178-79; Johnston, supra note 3, at 161 (claiming that the
modem grand jury is completely under the prosecutor's control).
275. See 1 U.S. DEmr. op JusTtcF, FEDmRAL GRAND JURY PRAcrncE MANUAl. 42-43 (1983)
(stating that criminal defense attorneys often request the prosecutor to present certain exculpatory
evidence to the grand jury); see infra notes 277-281 and accompanying text (describing several
potential defense strategies for the white collar criminal defense attorney).
276. See infra notes 277-281 and accompanying text (describing several potential defense
strategies for the white collar criminal defense attorney).
277. See ArrORNEYS" MANUAL, supra note 68, 9-27.220 (specifying that federal prosecutors
should not initiate a criminal prosecution unless there is sufficient admissible evidence to support the
conclusion that a suspect will probably be convicted).
278. IzL
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exculpatory evidence.279 The grand jury could find that the
exculpatory evidence negated an essential element of the
prosecution's case and refuse to return an indictment.280 Finally,
once the evidence was made known, the prosecutor ran the risk of
having the indictment dismissed for failing to disclose exculpatory
evidence to the grand jury.28 ' The defense attorney could create
a means for subsequently challenging the indictment if the
prosecution failed to disclose the exculpatory evidence to the grand
jury.
Although federal prosecutors are not legally obligated to present
exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, after Williams there remains
an ethical question concerning the withholding of such
evidence.2 2  The Justice Department and the American Bar
Association each believe that prosecutors have a moral obligation
to present evidence to the grand jury that substantially negates a
suspect's guilt.283  The prosecutor's obligation to disclose
exculpatory evidence flows from the prosecutor's basic duty to
seek justice in criminal proceedings. 284 Knowingly withholding
exculpatory evidence that would prevent the indictment of an
innocent person is clearly a breach of the prosecutor's ethical
obligation to seek justice.285 However, neither the federal
prosecutor's manual nor the ABA guidelines carry with them the
279. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1); Harnling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974)
(requiring the grand jury to find that each essential element of a charged offense has been established
before an indictment-will be valid).
280. See Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117 (stating that an indictment is invalid unless the grand jury
finds that each essential element of a charged offense has been established).
281. See United States v. Page, 808 F.2d 723,728 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 918
(1987); United States v. Flomenhoft, 714 F.2d 708,711 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068
(1984); United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 623 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 435 F. Supp. 610, 618 (N.D. Okla. 1977) (holding that federal prosecutors have a
duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the grand jury).
282. See GRAND JURY PRINcIPLE, supra note 68; GRAND JURY ACr, supra note 68;
ATrORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 68, 1 9-11.233 (requiring a prosecutor who is personally aware
of substantial evidence directly negating a suspect's guilt to present or otherwise disclose such
evidence to the grand jury).
283. GRAND JURY PRINcIP. , supra note 68; GRAND JURY AcT, supra note 68; ATromYS'
MANUAL, supra note 68, 9-11.233.
284. GRAND JURY PRINCIPL., supra note 68; GRAND JURY ACT, supra note 68.
285. Id
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force of law necessary to impose a duty on the prosecutor to
disclose exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.286 Without some
enforcement mechanism to ensure that federal prosecutors will
fulfill their ethical obligation, the standards espoused for
prosecutors will remain guidelines to be followed or rejected as
each individual deems appropriate. 28 7
After the Williams decision, the prosecutor's ethical character
is a factor that criminal defense attorneys must consider when
deciding how best to serve their clients.28  The defense attorney
may be able to persuade the prosecutor to drop an investigation by
disclosing exculpatory evidence that raises a significant doubt about
the probability of securing a conviction at trial.289 If the
prosecutor takes seriously the obligation to disclose exculpatory
evidence to the grand jury, the defense attorney may prevent an
indictment by making the prosecutor aware of substantial
exculpatory evidence.29 The prosecutor's ethical obligation to
disclose exculpatory evidence will have its greatest implication
when the prosecutor independently discovers evidence clearly
negating a suspect's guilt during the course of an investigation. In
this situation, the prosecutor is completely responsible for ensuring
that the grand jury is made aware of the exculpatory evidence.29'
The prosecutor's duty to seek justice is often in conflict with the
286. See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 753-54 (1979) (stating that a violation of
Department of Justice internal policy is not a grounds for dismissal); MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Preamble (1992) (stating that the model rules are not legally enforceable
standards).
287. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr Preamble (1992) (stating that the legal
profession is largely self regulating and that every attorney is responsible for observing the rules of
conduct).
288. See supra notes 282-287 and accompanying text (discussing the prosecutor's ethical
obligation to disclose clearly exculpatory evidence).
289. See supra notes 277-278 and accompanying text (describing the Department of Justice
policy not to initiate prosecutions unless conviction is probable).
290. See supra notes 279-280 and accompanying text (describing the requirement that the grand
jury find that each essential element of the charged offense has been established before returning an
indictment).
291. See supra notes 283-287 and accompanying text (discussing the prosecutor's ethical
obligation to disclose clearly exculpatory evidence).
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prosecutor's duty to obtain criminal convictions.2" As a result,
the prosecutor's ethical character may ultimately determine the
outcome of a grand jury indictment proceeding.
CONCLUSION
The decision in United States v. Williams reaffirms the Supreme
Court's position that grand jury indictments are presumptively
valid. The fact that criminal defendants are virtually powerless to
challenge an indictment demonstrates the Court's reluctance to
infringe upon the grand jury's law enforcement function. The
significance of the majority's holding lies in the fact that federal
courts are precluded from providing a remedy for many forms of
prosecutorial misconduct that may occur in the grand jury. The
prosecutor's ability to abuse the indictment process has led many
critics to call for changes in the indictment process. The Supreme
Court's decision in Williams made clear that any changes in the
grand jury system would not come from the courts. Unless
Congress is persuaded that additional procedural safeguards are
needed to ensure the integrity of the indictment process, federal
prosecutors will continue to dominate the grand jury.
Timothy K Talbot
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292. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1934) (stating that the prosecutor should
remain impartial yet prosecute with earnest and vigor); see also supra notes 55-58 and accompanying
text (describing the prosecutor's duty to seek justice and ensure that an accused is afforded a
fundamentally fair proceeding).
